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Expert's Testimony is Insufficient to Create a Question of Fact in the Face of a Summary Judgment Motion where the Conclusion Lacks Factual Support

June 29, 2010Julie TeuscherRelated Practice Areas: Appellate and Medical Liability

On June 29, 2010, the First District Appellate Court issued an opinion in which Cassiday Schade LLP represented St. Francis Hospital of Blue Island.  The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Plaintiff failed to establish through expert testimony that the defendants' alleged deviations proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.  The significance of this opinion stems from the Court's holding that plaintiff's expert's opinions that the "outcome would have been different" and the child "would have been delivered before the uterine rupture" if the defendants had complied with the standard of care were without factual support and therefore, insufficient to withstand the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff sought pre-natal care at Lincoln Medical Center on November 5, 2001 when she was approximately 38 weeks pregnant.  Her history included two prior deliveries in 1999 and 2000 by cesarean section.  When her examining gynecologist had difficulty hearing fetal heart tones, he sent her for fetal monitoring at Ingalls Hospital which in turn, sent her to St. Francis.  Fetal monitoring at St. Francis Hospital was normal.  The nurse at St. Francis determined that the patient was having moderate Braxton - Hicks contractions, consulted with the on-call Obstetrician by phone and followed his instructions to contact the patient's Obstetrician, advise him of the results of the monitoring and instruct the patient to return to her Obstetrician.  Two days later, on November 7, 2001, the patient developed severe abdominal pain and was taken to Ingalls where she had an emergency cesarean section at which time it was discovered that the patient's uterus had ruptured.  The baby subsequently died on November 17, 2001. 

Plaintiff's only expert witness testified that the defendants deviated from the standard of care by failing to advise the mother that she was at increased risk for uterine rupture from contractions because of her history of two prior cesarean sections.  Plaintiff's expert also testified that the patient should have been seen by an Obstetrician with delivering privileges on November 5 who could have advised the patient of her treatment options, including a cesarean section or close observation.  Plaintiff's expert testified that the outcome would have been different and the baby would have been delivered before the uterine rupture if the defendants had acted appropriately.  

While Plaintiff's expert offered the opinion that the outcome would have been different, cross-examination revealed he had no factual support for his opinion.  He could not say whether additional monitoring between November 5 and November 7 would have revealed any abnormalities necessitating an immediate cesarean section.  Relying on its 2008 decision in Wiedenbeck v. Searle, the Court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the expert's opinion would have allowed the jury to impermissibly speculate as to how and when definitive treatment should have been undertaken which might have prevented the outcome.

An expert's testimony, therefore, that the outcome would have been different had the defendants complied with the standard of care is insufficient to create a question of fact in the face of a summary judgment motion where the conclusion lacks factual support.

The time for challenging the attached opinion by way of a Petition for Re-Hearing or a Petition for Leave to Appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court has not yet expired, but we wanted to alert you to the existence and significance of this opinion.  If you have any questions regarding the decision, please contact a Cassiday Schade attorney.